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Abstract
Following Erceg et al. (2000), sticky wages are generally modelled assuming that households
set wage contracts à la Calvo (1983). This paper compares that sticky-wage model with one
where wage contracts are set by rms, assuming exible prices in any case. The key variable
for wage dynamics moves from the marginal rate of substitution (households set wages) to
the marginal product of labor (rms set wages). Optimal monetary policy in both cases fully
stabilizes wage ination and the output gap after technology or preference innovations. However,
nominal shocks make the assumption on who set wages relevant for optimal monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
In a highly inuential article, Erceg et al. (2000) show how sticky wages can be modeled in an
optimizing framework by giving households a xed probability à la Calvo (1983) to optimally
reset their wage contract.1 Thus, each household (or union as a group of households) owns some
di¤erentiated labor service and may decide the nominal wage associated with its labor supply.
This line of research started in 2006 while I was a visiting fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. I feel
completely grateful to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for its kind invitation and hospitality, and I also thank
Bill Gavin, James Bullard, and Ben McCallum for insightful comments and suggestions for this paper. Financial
support was provided by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (Postdoc Fellowships Program and Research
Project SEJ2005-03470/ECON).
yDepartamento de Economía, Universidad Pública de Navarra, 31006, Pamplona, Spain. E-mail:
mcasares@unavarra.es (Miguel Casares).
1The assumption of providing households with market power to set wages had already been taken in Blanchard
(1986) and Rankin (1998).
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The optimal wage can be reset only when receiving a market signal that arrives with a constant
probability. As a result, the dynamics of either wage ination or the real wage can be formulated
in a single equation. Fluctuations of wage ination (and the real wage) are governed by the
gap between the aggregate marginal rate of substitution of households and the real wage. This
sticky-wage structure is becoming very popular among New Keynesian researchers in recent times
(Amato and Laubach, 2003; Smets and Wouters, 2003; Woodford, 2003; Giannoni and Woodford,
2004; Christiano et al., 2005; Levin et al., 2005; Casares, 2007).2
As one alternative sticky-wage variant, this paper examines the implications of moving the
decision-making on the nominal wage from households to rms. Thus, the nominal wage contract
may also be the one that maximizes prot of a monopsonistically competitive rm subject to
a labor supply constraint.3 Nominal rigidities can be readily introduced as Calvo-style contracts
where rms are the wage setting actors. In turn, the paper shows how uctuations of wage ination
are explained by a forward-looking equation that depends on the gap between the marginal product
of labor and the real wage.
The consequences of nominal rigidities on the optimal design of monetary policy were rst
examined assuming that prices were sticky (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Clarida et al., 1999).
Such analysis was extended to the case of economies where both prices and wages were sticky by
Erceg et al. (2000).4 Our contribution on this regard is to derive the optimal monetary policy in
an optimizing macro model where the only source for nominal frictions is wage stickiness.5 In that
respect, the analysis will distinguish the implications of our two variants on wage setting actors
for optimal monetary policy within a general equilibrium economy with exible prices, and sticky
wages. Using the targeting rules approach introduced by Svensson (1999a, 1999b) and Woodford
(1999), the optimal monetary policy can be obtained by solving a central bank optimizing program
subject to a set of model equations. Furthermore, the central-bank objective function can be
written as an approximation to social welfare based on the average utility value. This paper also
2Analogously, a number of papers use Taylor (1980) staggered wage contracts set by households in a very similar
optimizing framework. As representative examples, see Ascari (2000), Huang and Liu (2004), and Huang et al.
(2004).
3Early contributions by Azariadis (1975), Hoehn (1988), and Flodén (2000) also put the wage setting decision on
prot-maximizing rms.
4See Woodford (2003, ch. 6), and Amato and Laubach (2004) for discussions on optimal monetary policy under
other model settings.
5A number of empirical papers recently argue that prices are not as sticky as generally assumed (Golosov and
Lucas, 2003; Bils and Klenow, 2004) and others put emphasis on sticky wages as the source of nominal rigidities in
the economy (Christiano et al., 2005; Levin et al., 2005).
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compares the welfare-theoretic loss function for the central bank in each variant of our sticky-wage
model.6 We nd that both cases agree on having variability of wage ination and the output gap as
the only monetary policy targets in a sticky-wage, exible-price economy. However, their optimal
policy reaction is distinct. If households set wages the rate of wage ination must fall when there
is a positive change in the output gap whereas the reaction must be of opposite sign in the case of
rms acting as wage setters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The sticky-wage model where households set wages
is described in Section 2. The case where rms are wage setting actors is introduced in Section 3
as another sticky-wage variant. Section 4 is devoted to the theoretical monetary policy analysis
as the optimal monetary policy rules are computed and discussed. The analysis is completed
in Section 5 with simulation exercises such as impulse-response functions, calculation of second-
moment statistics, and variance decomposition. Finally, Section 6 reviews the main conclusions of
the paper.
2 Sticky wages set by households
Since the well-known paper by Erceg et al. (2000), sticky wages have been typically incorporated
in the New Keynesian model by allowing households to set the nominal wage in the labor market.
Hence, each household owns a di¤erentiated labor service that supplies at her specic nominal
wage. In this setup, rms demand bundles of labor services to be employed in their production
processes. A labor bundle is obtained using the aggregation scheme rst described by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977)
nt =
Z 1
0
(nt(h))
(h 1)=h dh
h=(h 1)
; (1)
where the time period is indicated in the subscript of the variables, h > 1:0 is a constant parameter,
and nt(h) is the labor service provided by the h-th household. A competitive labor agency assembles
di¤erentiated labor services from households to get labor bundles that will sell to rms. The
maximum-prot condition for such labor agency leads to the following demand function (regarding
the h-th labor service)7
nt(h) =

Wt(h)
Wt
 h
nt; (2)
6To derive the welfare-theoretic loss functions, we borrow the computational methodology used by Erceg et al.
(2000) and Woodford (2003, ch. 6).
7See Erceg et al. (2000) for details.
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in which Wt(h) is the nominal wage set by the h-th household, Wt is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate
nominal wage, and h gives the elasticity of substitution across labor services. Also as in Erceg et
al. (2000), let us assume that a separable CRRA utility function ranks the preferences of the h-th
representative household over consumption, ct, and the supply of labor, nt(h),
Ut(h) =
exp(t) (ct)
1 
1    	
(nt(h))
1+
1 + 
; (3)
where t is an AR(1) shock on consumption preference, t = t 1 + "

t with "

t  N(0; ").
Units of consumption do not refer to the type of household because there are complete nancial
markets that ensure the same consumption across di¤erentiated households. Intertemporal utility
is maximized subject to a budget constraint and a demand for labor constraint as displayed in the
following optimizing program
Max Et
1X
j=0
jUt+j(h)
s:to :
Wt+j(h)
Pt+j
nt+j(h) = ct+j + (1 +Rt+j)
 1Bt+1+j(h)
Pt+j
  Bt+j(h)
Pt+j
for j = 0; 1; 2; :::
and to : nt+j(h) =

Wt+j(h)
Wt+j
 h
nt+j for j = 0; 1; 2; :::
The budget constraint is expressed in real magnitudes; labor real income may be spent on units
of consumption and on net purchases of bonds.8 If nominal wages can be optimally reset every
period, we would obtain, in period t, this rst order condition with respect to Wt(h)
&t
nt(h)
Pt
+ ht(h)
nt(h)
Wt(h)
= 0;
that includes the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint, &t, and on the labor-demand
constraint t(h). The rst order conditions for consumption and labor imply the following values
of the multipliers9
&t = Uct and t(h) =  

Unt(h) + &t
Wt(h)
Pt

; (4)
which can be substituted into the nominal wage optimality condition to yield
Wt(h)
Pt
=
h
h   1
 Unt(h)
Uct
: (5)
The optimal nominal wage sets the real wage as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution
(mrs) between disutility of labor and utility of consumption.
8Regarding notation, Pt is the aggregate price level in period t, Bt+1(h) is the nominal amount of bonds purchased
in period t to be reimbursed in period t+ 1, and Rt is the nominal interest rate attached to such purchase.
9For simplicity in notation, Uct represents the consumption marginal utility and Unt(h) the marginal disutility of
labor.
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Following the assumption by Calvo (1983), nominal rigidities on wage setting can be easily
introduced assuming that households only reset optimally the wage contract in states of nature
that arrive with a constant probability 1   . Therefore, households are not able to lay out the
optimal wage contract with  probability. As in Casares (2007), the fraction of households that
cannot set the optimal wage will apply the following stochastic indexation rule
Wt(s) = (1 + 
ss + t)Wt 1(s) (6)
referred to some s-th suboptimal household. The indexation factor in (6) depends on the steady-
state rate of ination, ss, and also on the stochastic element, t, which follows the AR(1) process
t = t 1 + "t with "t  N
 
0; 2"

. The t term can be interpreted as a cost-push shock that
will ultimately a¤ect the rate of economy-wide wage ination (as it will be shown below).
Incorporating sticky wages à la Calvo, the nominal wage optimality condition becomes
Et
1X
j=0
jj
24&t+j

jk=1 (1 + 
ss + t+k)

nt+j(h)
Pt+j
+ ht+j(h)
nt+j(h)
Wt(h)
35 = 0; (7)
whereas the rst order condition on the desired supply of labor for period t+ j turns out to be
t+j(h) =  
0@Unt+j(h) + &t+j

jk=1 (1 + 
ss + t+k)

Wt(h)
Pt+j
1A : (8)
Substituting (7) into (8), and then loglinearizing around steady state yield
cWt(h) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj( bPt+j + dmrst+j(h))  Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j ; (9)
where cWt(h) and bPt+j represent the log of the optimal nominal wage and the log of the aggregate
price level, and dmrst+j(h) represents the log of the mrs, i.e. dmrst+j(h) =  bUnt+j(h)   bUct+j .
Equation (9) can be transformed to present the optimal wage contract depending exclusively on
aggregate magnitudes (see Appendix A for the proof)
cWt(h) = cWt + (1  )
1 + h
Et
1X
j=0
jj (dmrst+j   bwt+j) + Et 1X
j=1
jj
 
Wt+j   t+j

; (10)
with cWt denoting the log of the aggregate nominal wage, dmrst the log of the aggregate mrs, andbwt the log of the aggregate real wage, bwt = cWt  bPt. In addition, Wt is the notation for the rate of
wage ination, Wt = cWt  cWt 1. The optimal wage contract has three determinants in (10): the
aggregate nominal wage, the current and future expected gaps between the aggregate mrs and the
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real wage, and the expected future rates of wage ination once the indexation shock is deducted.
The relative wage taken from (9) can be replaced by cWt(h) cWt = 1   Wt   t as obtained by
loglinearizing the aggregate nominal wage (cWt = (1 )cWt(h)+cWt 1+t). Then, by computing
Et
W
t+1 and calculating 
W
t   EtWt+1, we get to the following wage ination equation
Wt = Et
W
t+1 +
(1  )(1  )
(1 + h)
(dmrst   bwt) + (1  )t: (11)
Wage ination dynamics evolve depending on three arguments: expected wage ination, EtWt+1,
the gap between the mrs and the real wage, dmrst   bwt, and the exogenous indexation shock, t.
This is the wage ination equation commonly used in the New Keynesian model with sticky wages
(Erceg et al., 2000; Woodford, 2003, ch. 3; Smets and Wouters, 2003; Christiano et al., 2005) with
the novelty of the indexation shock, t.
With respect to prices, we suppose that they fully adjust every period to clear the labor market.
The exible-price assumption guarantees that the labor market is always in equilibrium. Thus, rms
can choose their demand for labor bundles that implies maximum prot. In turn, the exible-price
condition yields bwt = dmplt; (12)
where dmplt is the log of the marginal product of labor. Combining (11) and (12), it is obtained
Wt = Et
W
t+1 +
(1  )(1  )
(1 + h)
(dmrst  dmplt) + (1  )t: (13)
For illustrative purposes, we would rather present the wage ination equation as a function of the
output gap, eyt, which is dened as the di¤erence between the log of current output and the log of
potential output eyt = byt   byt: (14)
As suggested by Woodford (2003), potential (natural-rate) output is the amount of output obtained
in a perfect-competition economy with both exible prices and wages. If that is the case, it is well-
known that loglinear uctuations on the mrs must be equal to those on the marginal product of
labor, dmrst = dmplt, since both variables coincide with the real wage (Erceg et al., 2000).10 As
standard, let us assume that output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production technology
F (zt; nt) = [exp(zt)nt]
1  ; (15)
where 0 <  < 1, and zt is an AR(1) technology shock zt = zzt 1 + "zt with "zt  N(0; "z). The
condition dmrst = dmplt for one economy with the utility function (2) and the production function
10This can be easily veried by setting a null Calvo probability for non-optimal wage contracts ( = 0:0).
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(15) leads to the following equation for potential output uctuations
byt = 1 (1 )++ [(1 + ) zt + t] ; (16)
which implies dmrst  dmplt = (1 )++1   eyt:
The last result can be inserted in (13) to yield
Wt = Et
W
t+1 + heyt + (1  )t; (17)
with h =
(1 )(1 )
(1+h)
(1 )++
1  . The model with sticky wages set by households implies a positive
relationship between wage ination and the output gap.11 As we just showed above, a positive
output gap means that the mrs is higher than the marginal product of labor, and also higher than
the real wage (recall the exible-price condition bwt = dmplt). Under that circumstance, households
wish to work less hours and those that are able to reset their labor contract will choose a higher
nominal wage that deliver less hours when entering (2). As a result, the aggregate nominal wage
and the rate of wage ination will rise.
3 Sticky wages set by rms
This section introduces another way of modeling sticky wages assuming that rms are the wage
setting actors instead of households. An economy with wage setting rms requires some degree
of labor demand di¤erentiation to claim heterogeneity on wage contracts. Thus, in somehow a
symmetric manner to the model with household setting wages, each rm acts as a monopsonistically
competitor in the labor market because it is the only employer for a di¤erentiated type of labor
service. Meanwhile, householdsdisutility of labor depends on how many bundles of labor services
they supply, obtained from the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
nt =
"Z 1
0
nt(f)
1+f
f df
# f
1+f
(18)
where f > 0:0, and nt(f) represents the type of labor service supplied to the f -th rm. The
instantaneous utility function (3) can be rewritten for this model variant as follows
Ut =
exp(t)c
1 
t
1    	
n1+t
1 + 
; (19)
11The presence of EtWt+1 in (17) makes all expected future output gaps also a¤ect positively for the determination
of current wage ination.
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where nt is given by (18). Unlike the model with household setting wages, households are identical
and they decide the same amounts for consumption and labor services since they act both as price
takers and wage takers. The aggregate nominal wage is dened by Wt =
hR 1
0 Wt(f)
1+fdf
i 1
1+f so
that the amount of nominal labor income obtained from all di¤erentiated labor services supplied is
the same as the income obtained by supplying bundles of labor,
R 1
0 Wt(f)nt(f)df = Wtnt. Taking
this into account for the kind of budget constraint presented in the previous section, we can compute
the following households rst order conditions with respect to the number of labor bundles, nt,
and the supply of the f -th type of labor service, nt(f)
 	nt   &t
Wt
Pt
= 0;
 	nt n
  1
f
t (nt(f))
1
f   &tWt(f)
Pt
= 0:
The value of the Lagrange multiplier, &t, obtained from the rst equation can be substituted out
onto the second equation to yield
nt(f) =

Wt(f)
Wt
f
nt; (20)
which represents the supply of labor constraint faced by the f -th rm when setting its nominal wage
(analogous to (2) for the case of households setting wages). Note that the elasticity of substitution
of the household across di¤erentiated labor services is now positive at the constant parameter f .
Turning to the rmsoptimizing behavior on setting wages, let us suppose that they produce
output using the Cobb-Douglas technology (15). Assuming that rms seek to maximize intertem-
poral prots, the optimizing program for the f -th representative rm can be written as
Max Et
1P
j=0
j

F (zt+j ; nt+j(f))  Wt+j(f)
Pt+j
nt+j(f)

s:to nt+j(f) =

Wt+j(f)
Wt+j
f
nt+j for j = 0; 1; 2; :::
With no wage rigidity, the optimality condition on Wt(f) is
 nt(f)
Pt
  't(f)f
nt(f)
Wt(f)
= 0; (21)
where 't(f) is the Lagrange multiplier of the supply of labor constraint in period t. The value of
't(f) is dened by the rst order condition on the demand for labor nt(f)
't(f) =
Wt(f)
Pt
 mplt(f); (22)
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where mplt(f) denotes the marginal product of the f -th type of labor. Combining the last two
expressions and rearranging terms, we obtain
Wt(f) =
f
1 + f
Ptmplt(f):
The optimal wage contract is a fraction of the market-valued marginal product of labor. Therefore,
the value of the wage contract is obtained by applying the mark-down, f1+f , over the market value
of labor productivity.
Introducing both wage rigidities à la Calvo and the wage indexation rule (6) adapted to the
rm, the optimality condition (21) for the wage contract set in period t changes to
Et
1P
j=0
jj
24

jk=1 (1 + 
ss + t+k)

nt+j(f)
Pt+j
+ 't+j(f)f
nt+j(f)
Wt(f)
35 = 0;
where inserting (22) in the place of 't(f), and 't+j(f) =
(jk=1(1+
ss+t+k))Wt(f)
Pt+j
 mplt+j(f) for
future 't+j(f) terms conditional to no optimal wage resetting, we nd (after loglinearizing)
cWt(f) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj( bPt+j +dmplt+j(f))  Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j : (23)
The log of the optimal wage contract depends on current and expected future values of the log
of the price level and the log of the specic marginal product of labor. Using some algebra, the
optimal wage can also be written in terms of aggregate magnitudes as follows (see Appendix A for
the proof)
cWt(f) = cWt + (1  )
(1 + f )
Et
1X
j=0
jj
dmplt+j   bwt+j+ Et 1X
j=1
jj
 
Wt+j   t+j

: (24)
The interpretation of (24) is straightforward. The optimal nominal wage contract departs from the
aggregate nominal wage whenever current or expected future labor productivity values are above
the real wage, dmplt+j   bwt+j > 0:0, and also if the rate of wage ination is expected to be higher
than the innovation on the indexation rate, Wt+j   t+j > 0:0. In order to nd the rate of wage
ination equation for this economy, we can combine (24) with the implied relationship from the
Calvo-type aggregation scheme, Wt =
1 
 (
cWt(f) cWt) + t; to reach
Wt = Et
W
t+1 +
(1  ) (1  )
 (1 + f )
dmplt   bwt+ (1  )t: (25)
The rate of wage ination is a purely forward-looking variable whose quarter-to-quarter uctuations
are governed by the gap between the aggregate marginal product of labor and the real wage, as
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well as by the innovation on the wage indexation rule. When households set wages (equation 11),
wage ination was reacting to the gap between the households marginal rate of substitution and
the real wage. Hence, the labor productivity becomes the driving variable if rms become the wage
setting actors while that was the marginal rate of substitution when households set wages.
Recalling the exible-price scenario introduced above, prices will entirely adjust as needed to
clear the labor market. It implies bwt = dmrst; (26)
since the supply of labor bundles decided by households is optimal when their mrs equates the real
wage. This exible-price condition (26) can be plugged into (25) to obtain
Wt = Et
W
t+1 +
(1  ) (1  )
 (1 + f )
dmplt   dmrst+ (1  )t; (27)
and then substituting dmrst  dmplt = (1 )++1  eyt, it yields
Wt = Et
W
t+1   f eyt + (1  )t; (28)
with f =
(1 )(1 )
(1+f)
(1 )++
1  . Remarkably, the sticky-wage model where rms are wage setting
actors delivers a negative relationship between the output gap and wage ination, i.e., the opposite
sign to that obtained in the sticky-wage model where households set wages. When the output gap
is positive, the marginal product of labor falls below the real wage and rms wish to hire less labor.
Thus, rms that can decide on a new wage contract will drop the value of the nominal wage in
order to reduce the level of labor implied by (20). Besides their opposite sign, the numerical values
of the slope coe¢ cients are also di¤erent. Thus, the ratio of the output gap slopes in the wage
ination equations (17) and (28) is h f =  
1+f
1+h
.
4 Optimal monetary policy
The optimal monetary policy can be derived for the two variants of the sticky-wage model with
exible prices discussed above. The two cases only di¤er on who are the wage setting actors, either
households (as commonly assumed in the New Keynesian literature) or rms.
Following Woodford (2003, ch. 6), optimal monetary policy is obtained for some given model
from the rst order conditions that maximize a measure of social welfare approximated from the
utility function of that model. Such approximation consists of writing the average value of the
utility function across households as a second-order expression that depends on a few aggregate
variables of the model and also on the underlying structure of that model (price/wage rigidities,
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technology, distorting taxes,...). Since the second-order terms typically have a negative impact on
the measure obtained for social welfare, the central-bank objective function is presented as a loss
function to be minimized. The Appendix B of this paper shows that the period loss function of the
model where households set wages is12
Lht =
 
Wt
2
+ h (eyt   ey)2 ; (29)
where h =
(1 )(1 )
(1+h)
(1 )++
h(1 )2 and ey denotes the e¢ cient level of the output gap in steady
state.13 Therefore, welfare losses depend on the weighted sum of variabilities of wage ination and
the output gap relative to its e¢ ciency level.
For the case with rms setting wages, the welfare-theoretic loss function is (see also Appendix
B for the proof)
Lft =
 
Wt
2
+ f (eyt   ey)2 ; (30)
with f =
(1 )(1 )
(1+f )
(1 )++
f (1 )2 : Coincidently, social utility of households is also damaged by
variability of wage ination and the output gap when rms are wage setting actors. Therefore, the
case of having either rms or households setting the wage contracts does not a¤ect the denition of
the targeting variables on optimal monetary policy because they are wage ination and the output
gap in either way. However, the relative weight of the output gap is not exactly dened in (29) as
in (30) which may lead to distinctive policy reactions that will be examined in Section 5.14
For a long-run commitment to an optimal plan, we borrow the timeless perspectivecriterion,
proposed in Woodford (1999, page 18) and Woodford (2003, pages 538-539). Thus, the optimal
plan for monetary policy in the case of having households setting wages is obtained by solving the
following optimizing program:
Min Et
1P
j=0
j
 
Wt+j
2
+ h (eyt+j   ey)2
subject to the all-time sequence of wage ination equations
Wt+j = Et+j
W
t+j+1 + hEt+jeyt+j + (1  )Et+jt+j j = :::; 2; 1; 0; 1; 2; :::
The rst order conditions with respect to wage ination and the output gap in period t are
2Wt   'ht 1 + 'ht = 0, and
2h (eyt   ey)  h'ht = 0;
12The reader can verify that this welfare-theoretic loss function is the particular exible-price case of that derived
by Woodford (2003, pages 443-445).
13The e¢ cient output gap is the amount produced if markets were perfectly competitive with no distortion (see
Woodford, 2003, pages 393-394).
14Obviously, the di¤erent model structure may also have e¤ects on the design of optimal monetary policy.
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in which 'ht is the Lagrange multiplier in period t. Taking '
h
t =
2h
h
(eyt   ey) obtained from the
second equation, together with its lagged expression for 'ht 1, and inserting both into the rst
equation result in
Wt =  hh (eyt   eyt 1) ; (31)
where hh =
1
h(1 ) . According to the time-consistent plan (31), optimal monetary policy requires
that the rate of wage ination responds in the opposite direction to the rst-di¤erence of the output
gap. This policy resembles the "leaning against the wind" recommendation obtained by Clarida
et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003, ch. 7) for a New Keynesian framework with sticky prices à
la Calvo. If the output gap is increasing from the previous period the central bank must adjust
the nominal interest rate to turn the wage ination downwards by a factor of 1h(1 ) . Hence, the
optimal monetary policy requires anticyclical reactions of wage ination relative to the output gap.
Let us check if the alternative sticky-wage specication leads to the same condition for the
optimal monetary policy behavior. With rms setting wages, the central-bank optimizing program
is
Min Et
1P
j=0
j
 
Wt+j
2
+ f (eyt+j   ey)2
subject to the all-time sequence of wage ination equations
Wt+j = Et+j
W
t+j+1   fEt+jeyt+j + (1  )Et+jt+j j = :::; 2; 1; 0; 1; 2; :::
The rst order conditions on wage ination and the output gap for period t are
2Wt   'ft 1 + 'ft = 0, and
2f (eyt   ey) + f'ft = 0;
where 'ft is now the Lagrange multiplier. Inserting '
f
t =  2ff (eyt   ey) and its lagged expression
in the wage ination optimality condition, it yields
Wt =
f
f
(eyt   eyt 1) : (32)
with ff =
1
f (1 ) . Comparing (32) with (31), it seems that the optimal monetary policy is opposite
depending on the wage setting assumption. Thus, if rms are wage setting actors, the central bank
will pursue a monetary policy that adjusts wage ination on the same direction to the change in the
output gap. It could be said that wage ination must be procyclical since it should react with the
same sign to changes in the output gap. The reaction factor is 1f (1 ) which mimics that obtained
for the variant with households setting wages.
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What are the consequences of applying the optimal monetary policy for our two variants of a
sticky-wage model? In the case where households set wages, the central-bank optimality condition
(31) and its expected next periods expression can be substituted in the wage ination equation
(17) to yield (after little algebra)
eyt = hh(1+)+2h hEteyt+1 + eyt 1   (1 )hh ti : (33)
The only source of variability for the output gap in (33) is the wage indexation shock t. In
particular, a positive indexation shock brings in a negative output gap. Real-side shocks such as
technology or preference innovations have no impact on the output gap.15 The nominal interest rate
would adjust as necessary to bring current output back at its potential level. Therefore, the output
gap will have no variability under the optimal policy in the absence of indexation shocks. Moreover,
wage ination would also stay constant as implied by equation (17). The optimal monetary policy
would be fully e¢ cient because the loss function would value zero at all times. The presence
of (nominal-side) wage indexation shocks is necessary to evaluate optimal policy tradeo¤s in our
exible-price model with sticky wages set by households. This result was already pointed out by
Taylor (1979) and Clarida et al. (1999) as the lack of an output-ination variability tradeo¤ in
models without nominal shocks (also called cost-push shocks).
Turning to the case of rms acting as wage setters, the optimality condition (32) can be combined
with the wage ination equation (28) to obtain
eyt = ff (1+)+2f hEteyt+1 + eyt 1 + (1 )ff ti : (34)
As in the case where households set wages, the evolution of the output gap also depends here
exclusively on wage indexation shocks, t. Nevertheless, the output gap becomes positive in (34)
after a positive realization of t. Another implication of (34) is that both technology and preference
shocks are also neutralized by the optimal monetary policy and leave no e¤ect on the output gap.
With no change in the output gap, those real-side shocks have no impact on wage ination as
implied by (28). Therefore, the model with rms setting wages also needs (nominal) indexation
shocks for evaluating tradeo¤s between output gap and wage ination variabilities. Without such
nominal perturbations, optimal monetary policy achieves full stabilization in both model variants.
15A preference shock can be considered a real shock because it shifts the aggregate labor supply curve.
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5 Model simulations with alternative wage setting actors
Table 1 summarizes the key equations that show why the assumption on who are the wage setting
actors is relevant for a sticky-wage model. There are three aspects of the model a¤ected. First,
wage ination dynamics are di¤erent because its relationship to the output gap may be positive
(households set wages) or negative (rms set wages). Secondly, the optimal monetary policy implies
a central-bank reaction of opposite sign: the rate of wage ination must decrease when there is a
positive change in the output gap (households set wages) whereas wage ination must be raised
in reaction to that output gap change (rms set wages). At the third level of distinction shown
in Table 1, the exible-price assumption gives rise to di¤erent market-clearing conditions for the
labor market. Either the (log of the) real wage must be equal to the (log of the) marginal product
of labor (households set wages) or the (log of the) real wage equates the (log of the) marginal rate
of substitution (rms set wages).16
So far, we have shown that having either households or rms as wage setters plays a role on the
dynamic behavior of wage ination and also on the design of the optimal monetary policy. Is this
also inuential on the short-run uctuations of other key macro variables such as output or (price)
ination? To answer this question we need to build the rest of the model. For the demand sector,
let us introduce the following IS equation
byt = Etbyt+1   1 (Rt   Ett+1) + 1  t; (35)
which can be obtained by combining the rst order conditions on consumption and bonds on the
household optimizing program presented in Section 2. As typical in a New Keynesian framework,
output uctuations in (35) are demand-determined in response to changes in expected output,
the real interest rate (with a negative impact), and the consumption preference shock. Finally,
the denition of the economy-wide real wage, wt = WtPt , implies that the rates of price and wage
ination are related as follows
t = 
W
t   bwt + bwt 1: (36)
Summarizing, we have two variants for a exible-price model with sticky wages à la Calvo, and
optimal monetary policy:
- A model where households are wage setting actors: The three equations on the left column of
Table 1, plus common equations (14), (16), (35), and (36) comprise a set of seven equations that
provide solution paths for seven variables byt, t, Wt , bwt, Rt, eyt, and byt.
16The loglinearized marginal rate of substitution displayed in Table 1 can be obtained by using the specication
for the utility function (19), the Cobb-Douglas technology (15), and the market-clearing condition byt = bct.
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- A model where rms are wage setting actors: The three equations on the right column of
Table 1, plus common equations (14), (16), (35), and (36), comprise a set of seven equations that
provide solution paths for seven variables byt, t, Wt , bwt, Rt, eyt, and byt.
For illustrative purposes, we will simulate these two sticky-wage variants by analyzing impulse-
response functions and some business cycle statistics obtained from them. On that regard, some
numerical values need to be assumed on the parameters of the models (see Table 2). Repeating the
baseline quarterly calibration chosen by Erceg et al. (2000), we have  = 0:99,  = 1:5,  = 1:5,
h = 4:0,  = 0:3, and wage contracts last on average for one year,  = 0:75. The households
elasticity of substitution across labor services in the model where wages are decided by rms is set
at f = 4:0 to have it equal to that elasticity for the other model variant.
As for the stochastic elements of the model, some reasonable numbers are arbitrarily assigned.17
Thus, the standard deviations on the innovations of the real-side shocks are those that yield a stan-
dard deviation of potential output around 1.8%, and 3/4 of uctuations of potential output are
driven by technology shocks.18 The innovations on the wage indexation shock have a standard devi-
ation that provides signicant reactions of wage ination in the impulse-response analysis (around
0.5% in annualized terms). As common in the literature, the coe¢ cient of autocorrelation of the
technology shock is very high (z = 0:95) whereas preference shocks have less inertia ( = 0:80).
The wage indexation shock also has a moderate coe¢ cient of autocorrelation ( = 0:80) as assumed
by Woodford (2003, page 496) for his analogous cost-push shock.
As a result of our numerical selection, the slope coe¢ cients in the wage ination equations of
Table 1 are rather distinctive. If rms are wage setting actors, wage ination is much more sensitive
to the output gap because the slope coe¢ cient is f = 0:159, more than three times that slope
when households set wages (h = 0:050). A similar result is obtained when comparing the relative
weight of the output gap variability in the central-bank loss function. Stabilizing the output gap
appears to be more important for social welfare if rms set wages (f = 0:057 versus h = 0:018).
The business cycle properties of the two variants presented above can be examined by describing
the reactions to a technology shock, zt, a consumption preference shock, t, and an indexation
shock, t. The technology shock represents a supply-side shock because it gives rise to output
uctuations due to exogenous changes in productivity. Meanwhile, the preference shock represents
a demand-side shock since the desired level of consumption is exogenously altered as a result of a
change in its marginal utility. The indexation shock can be viewed as one example of a cost-push
shock used in the literature on optimal monetary policy to analyze preferences on macroeconomic
17The aim of this paper is to show theoretical aspects without any particular empirical t to some actual economy.
18The latter was veried in the long-run variance decomposition.
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stabilization. What are the inuence of these shocks in the model variants? Is the assumption on
who set wages critical for the business cycle patterns in sticky-wage models with exible prices and
optimal monetary policy? We will try to give answers to these questions by computing impulse-
response functions and selected statistics from each model variant.
Throughout Figures 1-3, impulse response functions are plotted as fractional deviations from
steady state for output, and the real wage, while annualized departures from their steady-state
levels for price ination, wage ination, and the nominal interest rate. The shocks are normalized
by their standard deviations provided in Table 2.
Technology shocks
Figure 1 shows the responses to a technology shock in the sticky-wage model where either
households set wages or rms do it. Interestingly, all variables react in the same way with either
households or rms setting wages as identically displayed in Figure 1. At rst, the optimal monetary
policy is able to fully stabilize both wage ination and the output gap under either case.19 A zero
output gap implies that current output is at its potential level (byt = byt), which yields a 0.5% sudden
increase that incorporates long inertia. Putting the zero output gap di¤erently, uctuations of the
aggregate marginal product of labor (of rms) are the same as those of the aggregate marginal
rate of substitution (of households). Accordingly, the real wage reports in both cases an upward
response consistent with the productivity hike (see Figure 1). Meanwhile, there is a sharp one-time
ination drop, deeper than 2% in annualized terms, required to clear the labor market. Finally, it
is worth commenting on the optimal reaction of the nominal interest rate to a technology shock.
As displayed in Figure 1, the nominal interest rate must be lowered at the time of the shock in
order to help current (demand-determined) output to catch up with potential output and close
down the output gap. This monetary policy ease has two characteristics: rst, it represents a weak
reaction because the interest-rate cut is only by 6 (annualized) basis points at most. The second
characterizing aspect is that the nominal interest rate returns very slowly to its steady-state level.
As shown in Figure 1, half of the initial interest-rate cut still remains in place fteen quarters after
the shock.
Summarizing, a supply-side technology shock that raises productivity brings about long-lasting
increases in current output and the real wage, a one-time drop in ination, and keep wage ination
and the output gap unchanged. This result is observed when applying the optimal monetary policy
based on a gentle and persistent interest-rate cut. These responses are obtained independently
19This result was already discussed at the end of Section 4.
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from the assumption on who set wages in the labor market.
Preference shocks
Figure 2 displays how a demand-side shock on consumption preference has the same impact
on the two sticky-wage variants. Since this is another example of a real-side shock, the optimal
monetary policy also achieves full stabilization for wage ination and the output gap in both cases.
Thus, output and potential output equally rise; a 0.4% increase at the time of the shock that fades
out after 8-10 quarters. Meanwhile, the real wage drops due to the reduction in the mrs (or in the
marginal product of labor). Ination also reacts equally in both sticky-wage variants as it rises by
more than 0.5% at the quarter of the shock although it returns to its steady state rate in the next
quarter.
The optimal policy requires a strong monetary tightening: the nominal interest rate must be
raised by 57 (annualized) basis points at the quarter of the shock (see Figure 2). The return of the
nominal interest rate to its steady-state level should take 8-10 quarters. Therefore, the response
of the nominal interest rate to a preference shock is larger, less persistent, and with opposite sign
to that observed after a technology shock. This contractionary monetary policy is the necessary
central-bank action to pull down current output onto its potential (natural-rate) level and therefore
eliminate the output gap.
Indexation shocks
Unlike the two real-side shocks examined above, a (nominal) indexation shock allows di¤erent
responses across our two variants for a sticky-wage model. As a matter of fact, the reactions di¤er
signicantly in terms of both output and price ination. Hence, output slightly goes up if rms set
wages whereas it drops by a much greater extent if households set wages (see Figure 3). Why do
we obtain such di¤erentiated output reactions? Since the wage indexation shock does not a¤ect
potential output, the response of the output gap is the same as the response of output in both
models. If rms are wage setting actors, the negative relationship between wage ination and the
output gap in (28) makes the central bank to increase the output gap in order to reduce wage
ination as indicated by the optimal policy condition (32). When households are wage setters, the
relationship between wage ination and the output gap is positive in (17) and the optimal monetary
policy (31) will create a negative output gap to stabilize wage ination.
The optimal response of the nominal interest rate is also sensitive to the assumption on who
set wages. As shown in Figure 3, the nominal interest rate drops around 50 basis points if rms set
wages whereas there is much larger interest-rate cut (150 basis points) when households set wages.
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Summarizing, the implementation of optimal monetary policy in a sticky-wage model with
exible prices and alternative wage setting actors leads to the same responses to real-side shocks
but to signicantly di¤erent reactions to nominal shocks.
Table 3 provides a selection of second-moment statistics computed from the two sticky-wage
models. Output, the nominal interest rate, and, especially, the output gap are more volatile in the
model with households setting wages as much higher standard deviations were found. This is a
consequence of their larger reactions observed after a wage indexation shock. Wage ination is much
more stable than price ination in both model cases.20 Regarding inertia, output, the real wage,
and the output gap show long time persistence, characterized by high coe¢ cients of autocorrelation
in Table 3. The nominal interest rate moves along with moderate inertia when applying the optimal
monetary policy in both models (coe¢ cients of autocorrelation around 0.6-0.7). The exible-price
assumption leads to coe¢ cients of autocorrelation of ination close to zero. The only discrepancy
between the two model variants in terms of autocorrelations is that the coe¢ cient on wage ination
is somewhat higher if households set wages.
As for the coe¢ cients of correlation with output, Table 3 reports that price ination, wage
ination, and the nominal interest rate are basically acyclical in the two variants, with coe¢ cients
close to zero in all the cases. The real wage is clearly procyclical only in the model with rms
setting wages.
Finally, the variance decomposition in the long-run (200 periods ahead) is displayed in Table 4.
Technology shocks are the source of most uctuations in output, the real wage, and price ination
in both sticky-wage cases. Meanwhile, preference shocks are the driving force for changes in the
nominal interest rate also in both variants, though especially in the model where rms set wages.
Wage indexation shocks explain all the variations in the two targeting variables of monetary policy:
wage ination and the output gap. This result was anticipated above in the impulse-response
functions analysis where the impact of technology and preference shocks on these variables were
fully neutralized by optimal monetary policy. Indexation shocks also determine a signicant fraction
of long-run uctuations on output and the nominal interest rate in the model where households are
wage setting actors, and on price ination and the real wage in the variant where rms set wages
(around 0.2 in all cases).
20This result should be expected for exible-price models where price ination variability is not a targeting variable
for the central bank.
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6 Conclusions
The assumption on who set wages is not trivial for an optimizing macroeconomic model with sticky
wages. If households may decide on the value of nominal wage contracts, the optimal contract will
depend on the di¤erence between the marginal rate of substitution and the real wage. By contrast,
if rms can set the wage contract, they will determine its value looking at the di¤erence between
the marginal product of labor and the real wage.
In addition, we have shown that, in a sticky-wage, exible-price economy with Calvo-type wage
contracts, the rate of wage ination is forward-looking on the output gap with a sign dened by
who are the wage setting actors. Hence, when households set wages the relationship is of positive
sign whereas when rms set wages that relationship turns negative. In addition, the assumption on
wage setting actors distinguishes the analytical value of the output gap slope in the wage ination
equation

h
 f =  
1+f
1+h

.
Finally, optimal (welfare-theoretic) monetary policy must minimize, in both variants for a sticky-
wage model, a weighted sum of variabilities of the output gap and the rate of wage ination. The
central bank optimal plan leads to a di¤erent targeting rule on each case: wage ination must react
either positively (rms set wages) or negatively (households set wages) to the output gap. Despite
their di¤erent targeting rule, optimal monetary policy in both cases achieves full stabilization of
the two targeting variables in the presence of either technology or preference shocks. Nevertheless,
the assumption on who act as wage setters is relevant for the optimal interest-rate responses to
(nominal) wage indexation shocks. Such nominal shocks also give rise to distinctive second-moment
statistics.
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APPENDIX A. Derivation of the equation for uctuations on the optimal nominal wage de-
pending on aggregate variables.
i) Model with wages set by households.
Let us start from repeating equation (9) from the text
cWt(h) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj( bPt+j + dmrst+j(h))  Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j ; (A1)
where dmrst+j(h) represents uctuations on the mrs for the households who decide the optimal
contract in period t and will not adjust it in future periods. From the denition of the (aggregate)
real wage, we can substitute bPt+j = cWt+j   bwt+j = cWt +Pjk=1 Wt+k   bwt+j into (A1) to obtain
cWt(h) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj(cWt   bwt+j + dmrst+j(h)) + Et 1X
j=1
jj
 
Wt+j   t+j

: (A2)
Recalling our utility function specication (3), the (log-linearized) relationship between the household-
specic mrs and the aggregate mrs is
dmrst+j(h) = dmrst+j + (bnt+j(h)  bnt+j): (A3)
Now we wish to write the relative mrs as a function of the relative wage. Using (2) in loglinear
terms for the t+ j period conditional to the indexation rule (6), it yields
bnt+j(h)  bnt+j =  h(cWt(h) + jX
k=1
t+k  cWt+j); (A4)
where it should be noticed that the conditional wage contract evolves as cWt(h)+Pjk=1 t+k in any
t+ j future period. Combining (A3) and (A4), it is obtained
dmrst+j(h) = dmrst+j   h(cWt(h) + jX
k=1
t+k  cWt+j);
where inserting cWt+j = cWt +Pjk=1 Wt+k leads to
dmrst+j(h) = dmrst+j   h(cWt(h) cWt   jX
k=1
 
Wt+k   t+k

): (A5)
Finally, the substitution of (A5) into (A2) yields
cWt(h) = (1 )Et 1X
j=0
jj((1+h)cWt+dmrst+j  bwt+j hcWt(h)+(1+h)Et 1X
j=1
jj
 
Wt+j   t+j

:
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Putting terms together, we can write a dynamic equation for the wage contract that depends
entirely on aggregate magnitudes
cWt(h) = cWt + (1  )
1 + h
Et
1X
j=0
jj (dmrst+j   bwt+j) + Et 1X
j=1
jj
 
Wt+j   t+j

;
which is equation (10) in the main text of the paper.
ii) Model with wages set by rms.
In section 3, we obtained equation (23) for uctuations on the optimal nominal wage contract
set in period t
cWt(f) = (1  )Et 1X
j=0
jj( bPt+j +dmplt+j(f))  Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j ; (A6)
where dmplt+j(f) denotes the marginal product of labor in case of no optimal wage adjustment over
future periods. The (log-linear) Cobb-Douglas production technology (15) can be used to nd the
relative relationship between the marginal product of labor and demand for labor
dmplt+j(f) dmplt+j =  (bnt+j(f)  bnt+j): (A7)
Loglinearizing the labor supply constraint (20) for period t+ j and using the wage indexation rule
(6), we get
bnt+j(f) = bnt+j + f
 cWt(f) + jX
k=1
t+k  cWt+j
!
: (A8)
The combination of (A7) and (A8) leads to
dmplt+j(f) = dmplt+j   f
 cWt(f) + jX
k=1
t+k  cWt+j
!
;
which can be inserted in (A6) to reach
cWt(f) = (1 )Et 1X
j=0
jj
 bPt+j +dmplt+j   f cWt(f)  EtcWt+j (1 + f )Et 1X
j=1
jjt+j :
Terms on the aggregate price level are dropped by inserting bPt+j = cWt+j   bwt+j . Next, we can usecWt+j = cWt +Pjk=1 Wt+k to nd
(1 + f )cWt(f) = (1 )Et 1X
j=0
jj(dmplt+j  bwt+j+(1 + f )cWt)+(1 + f )Et 1X
j=1
jj
 
Wt+j   t+j

;
which can be also written as our equation (24) of the text
cWt(f) = cWt + (1  )
(1 + f )
Et
1X
j=0
jj
dmplt+j   bwt+j+ Et 1X
j=1
jj
 
Wt+j   t+j

:
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APPENDIX B. Derivation of the welfare-theoretic loss function for the variants of the sticky-
wage model of the paper.
All the approximations taken here are based on second-order Taylor expansions used in Erceg
et al. (2000, pages 307-312), and Woodford (2003, pages 692-696).
i) Model where households set wages.
For convenience, let us dene Vt =
exp(t)(ct)
1 
1  and St(h) = 	
(nt(h))
1+
1+ from the utility function
(3) such that
Ut(h) = Vt   St(h): (B1)
After dropping out constant and exogenous terms, the second-order Taylor approximation of Vt
yields
Vt ' Uc [ct   c] + 1
2
Ucc [ct   c]2 + Uc [ct   c] [exp(t)  1] :
By inserting the equilibrium condition ct = yt, using Ucc =  Ucc , and the approximation [exp(t)  1] '
t, it is obtained
Vt ' Uc [yt   y]  1
2
Uc
y
[yt   y]2 + Uc [yt   y]t: (B2)
A second-order Taylor expansion for yty is
yt
y
' 1 + byt + 1
2
by2t ; (B3)
which implies the second-order approximations
[yt   y] ' y
byt + 1
2
by2t and [yt   y]2 ' y2by2t ; (B4)
that can be substituted in (B2) to reach
Vt ' yUc
byt + 1
2
by2t  12yUcby2t + yUc
byt + 1
2
by2tt:
Next, the term yUc 12by2t t is dropped for being of third order and terms are grouped to obtain the
nal second-order approximation of Vt
Vt ' yUc
byt + 1
2
(1  )by2t + bytt : (B5)
Let us turn to the second term in (B1), St(h) = 	
(nt(h))
1+
1+ . Its second-order Taylor approximation
becomes
St(h) ' Un [nt(h)  n] + 1
2
Unn [nt(h)  n]2 ; (B6)
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where constant and exogenous terms were taken out. Using Unn =
Un
n and the approximations
analogous to (B4) for [nt(h)  n] and [nt(h)  n]2 in (B6), it yields
St(h) ' nUn
bnt(h) + 1
2
(1 + )bn2t (h) : (B7)
Integrating the household-specic utility function (B1) over all di¤erentiated households, we obtain
the aggregate utility function
Ut =
Z 1
0
Ut(h)dh = Vt  
Z 1
0
St(h)dh; (B8)
that represents the social utility function to be maximized by the central bank. Here, we need to
aggregate the labor disutility across households. Using (B7), it yieldsZ 1
0
St(h)dh ' nUn

Ehbnt(h) + 1
2
(1 + )
h
(Ehbnt(h))2 + varhbnt(h)i ; (B9)
where, following Woodford (2003, page 694), we used the denitions Ehbnt(h) = R 10 bnt(h)dh and
varhbnt(h) = R 10 bn2t (h)dh   (Ehbnt(h))2 : A Taylor series approximation to (1) implies the following
equation for aggregate labor uctuations
bnt ' Ehbnt(h) + 1
2
h   1
h
varhbnt(h);
which can be used to eliminate both Ehbnt(h) and (Ehbnt(h))2 from (B9) and thus to obtain (after
dropping terms of order higher than two)Z 1
0
St(h)dh ' nUn
bnt + 1
2
(1 + )bn2t + 12( +  1h )varhbnt(h)

: (B10)
Now, both (B5) and (B10) can be substituted in the social utility function (B8) to get
Ut ' yUc
byt + 1
2
(1  )by2t + bytt  nUnbnt + 12(1 + )bn2t + 12( +  1h )varhbnt(h)

: (B11)
The (log-linear) Cobb-Douglas production function (15) relates labor and output in the following
way bnt = (1   ) 1byt   zt, which implies bn2t = (1   ) 2by2t + z2t   2(1   ) 1bytzt. Taking into
account these two relationships, (B11) can be rewritten in terms of output uctuations and the
dispersion of di¤erentiated labor services
Ut ' yUc
byt + 1
2
(1  )by2t + bytt (B12)
 nUn

(1  ) 1byt + 1
2
(1 + )

(1  ) 2by2t   2(1  ) 1bytzt+ 12( +  1h )varhbnt(h)

;
where exogenous terms were dropped. Following Woodford (2003, chapter 6), the steady-state
solution of the model with zero ination implies the relationship nUn = yUc(1  )(1 y) where
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1   y represents the inverse of the steady-state markup of the real wage over the mrs.21 This
result can be used in (B12) to obtain
Ut ' yUc

ybyt   1
2

(1 )++
1 
 by2t + byt (t + (1 + )zt)  12(1  )( +  1h )varhbnt(h)

;
(B13)
where the terms yby2t ; ybytzt, and yvarhbnt(h) were neglected as justied by Woodford (2003,
pages 393-394). Again,. following Woodford (2003, page 395), the di¤erence between the output
gap and its e¢ ciency level is eyt   ey = byt   byt  ey; (B14)
where ey is obtained as the fractional di¤erence in steady-state between the level of output produced
in a perfectly competitive economy and the level of potential output obtained in a monopolisti-
cally competitive economy, i.e. ey = log yy . For the model described in the text, we haveey =  $ log(1   y) ' $y where $ completely depends on the values of parameters regarding
preferences and technology $ = 1 (1 )++ . Computing the square of the e¢ cient output gap
dened in (B14) and using the approximation ey = $y, the square output uctuations, by2t , can
be written as follows
by2t = (eyt   ey)2 + 2bytbyt + 2$ybyt   2$ybyt   by2t   ($y)2 ; (B15)
where potential output uctuations are byt = $ (t + (1 + )zt) as in equation (16) of the text.
Inserting (B15) into (B14), we obtain (after dropping exogenous terms)
Ut '  yUc

1
2
$ 1 (eyt   ey)2 + (1  )( +  1h )varhbnt(h) : (B16)
By loglinearizing (2), the variance on di¤erentiated labor services can be expressed in terms of wage
dispersion
varhbnt(h) = 2hvarhcWt(h): (B17)
Applying the results of Woodford (2003, page 694-696) to our Calvo-style sticky-wage structure,
we have
varhcWt(h) ' varhcWt 1(h) + 
1  
 
Wt
2
;
which implies
1X
j=0
jEtvarhcWt+j(h) ' 
(1  ) (1  )
1X
j=0
jEt
 
Wt+j
2
(B18)
21 In this particular sticky-wage model, y =  1h .
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Inserting (B17) in (B16), it is obtained
Ut '  yUc

1
2
$ 1 (eyt   ey)2 + (1  )h(1 + h)varhcWt(h) : (B19)
Finally, let us assume that the central bank maximizes the intertemporal (social) utility functionP1
j=0 
jEtUt+j . Combining (B19), and (B18), it yields
1X
j=0
jEtUt+j '  1
2
yUc
1X
j=0
jEt

$ 1 (eyt+j   ey)2 + (1  )h(1 + h)
(1  ) (1  )
 
Wt+j
2
: (B20)
Rearranging terms in (B20), we have
1X
j=0
jEtUt+j '  
h
1X
j=0
jEt
 
Wt+j
2
+$ 1
(1  ) (1  )
(1  )h(1 + h) (eyt+j   ey)2

;
with 
h =
yUc
2
(1 )h(1+h)
(1 )(1 ) , which implies that the central-bank loss function for period t is
Lht =
 
Wt
2
+ h (eyt   ey)2 ;
with h =
(1 )(1 )
(1+h)
(1 )++
h(1 )2 as dened in equation (29) of the text.
ii) Model where rms set wages.
In this case, the household utility function and the social utility function are the same because
both consumption and the supply of bundles of labor services are identical across households.
Recalling (19), the social utility function in period t is in this model
Ut =
exp(t) (ct)
1 
1    	
(nt)
1+
1 + 
= Vt   St: (B21)
As shown above, the two terms of (B21) can be approximated by the Taylor series expansions
Vt ' yUc
byt + 1
2
(1  )by2t + bytt ; and (B22a)
St ' nUn
bnt + 1
2
(1 + )bn2t : (B22b)
The term on disutility from the supply of labor bundles, St, will be a¤ected by the degree of wage
dispersion through its impact on uctuations of market-clearing labor, bnt. Thus, a Taylor series
expansion on (20) yields bnt ' Efbnt(f) + 1
2

1 + f
f

varfbnt(f); (B23)
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where Efbnt(f) and varfbnt(f) respectively denote the expected value of the demand for labor
and its variance computed across the di¤erentiated rms. Recalling the log-linear Cobb-Douglas
technology (15) for the specic f -th rm, we obtain
bnt(f) = (1  ) 1byt(f)  zt;
which, aggregating over the f space, implies
Efbnt(f) = (1  ) 1Ef byt(f)  zt; and (B24)
varfbnt(f) = (1  ) 2varf byt(f):
Aggregate output in this economy with di¤erentiated rms is yt =
R 1
0 yt(f)df , which leads to the
Taylor series approximation byt ' Ef byt(f) + 1
2
varf byt(f): (B25)
Substituting (B24) into (B23) and then the value of Ef byt(f) implied by (B25), it is obtained
bnt ' (1  ) 1 byt   1
2
varf byt(f)  zt + 1
2

1 + f
f

varfbnt(f);
where inserting varf byt(f) = (1  )2varfbnt(f) from (B24) results in
bnt ' (1  ) 1 byt   1
2
(1  )2varfbnt(f)  zt + 1
2

1 + f
f

varfbnt(f):
Putting terms together and dropping the exogenous variable, we get
bnt ' (1  ) 1byt + 1
2

+  1f

varfbnt(f): (B26)
The substitution of (B26) into (B22b) yields
St ' nUn

(1  ) 1byt + 1
2
(+  1f )varfbnt(f) + 12(1 + )bn2t

;
where using bn2t = (1   ) 2by2t   2(1   ) 1bytzt from the log-linear Cobb-Douglas technology (15)
results in
St ' nUn

(1  ) 1byt + 1
2
(+  1f )varfbnt(f) + 12(1 + )(1  ) 2by2t   (1 + )(1  ) 1bytzt

:
(B27)
The steady-state relationship nUn = yUc(1 )(1 y), which was already used above, still holds
in this model because it keeps the same preferences and technology.22 Plugging that into (B27), it
yields
St ' yUc(1  y)
byt + 1
2
(1  )(+  1f )varfbnt(f) + 12(1 + )(1  ) 1by2t   (1 + )bytzt

:
(B28)
22Nevertheless, the value of y is now y = (1 + f )
 1.
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Using (B22a) for Vt and (B28) for St, the social utility function can be approximated by
Ut ' yUc

ybyt   1
2
$ 1by2t + byt (t + (1 + )zt)  12(1  )(+  1f )varfbnt(f)

;
recalling $ = 1 (1 )++ and where the terms yby2t ; ybytzt, and yvarfbnt(f) were dropped as
we did in the model where households set wages. The denition of the e¢ cient output gap was
used above to obtain (B15) which can be inserted in the last expression to nd (after dropping
exogenous terms and using byt = $ (t + (1 + )zt))
Ut '  yUc
2

$ 1 (eyt   ey)2 + (1  )(+  1f )varfbnt(f) : (B29)
By loglinearizing (20), the variance on di¤erentiated labor services can be expressed in terms of
wage dispersion
varfbnt(f) = 2fvarfcWt(f);
which leaves (B29) as follows
Ut '  yUc
2

$ 1 (eyt   ey)2 + f (1  )(1 + f )varfcWt(f) :
Accordingly, the central-bank intertemporal (social) utility function
P1
j=0 
jEtUt+j becomes
1X
j=0
jEtUt+j '  yUc
2
1X
j=0
jEt

$ 1 (eyt+j   ey)2 + f (1  )(1 + f )varfcWt+j(f) : (B30)
Again, we can use Woodford (2003, pages 694-696) to have
varfcWf (h) ' varfcWt 1(f) + 
1  
 
Wt
2
;
which implies
1X
j=0
jEtvarfcWt+j(f) ' 
(1  ) (1  )
1X
j=0
jEt
 
Wt+j
2
: (B31)
Combining (B30) and (B31), it is obtained
1X
j=0
jEtUt+j '  yUc
2
1X
j=0
jEt

$ 1 (eyt+j   ey)2 + f (1  )(1 + f )
(1  ) (1  )
 
Wt+j
2
;
which can be reorganized as follows
1X
j=0
jEtUt+j '  
f
1X
j=0
jEt
 
Wt+j
2
+$ 1
(1  ) (1  )
f (1  )(1 + f ) (eyt+j   ey)2

;
with 
f =
yUc
2
f (1 )(1+f )
(1 )(1 ) . Our last result implies that the central-bank loss function for period
t is
Lft =
 
Wt
2
+ f (eyt   ey)2 ;
with f =
(1 )++
1 
(1 )(1 )
f (1 )(1+f ) as dened in equation (30) of the text.
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Table 1. Key equations for a exible-price, sticky-wage model with optimal monetary policy
Households set wages Firms set wages
Wage ination: Wt = Et
W
t+1 + heyt + (1  )t Wt = EtWt+1   f eyt + (1  )t
Opt. monetary policy: Wt =   1h(1 ) (eyt   eyt 1) Wt = 1f (1 ) (eyt   eyt 1)
Flexible prices: bwt =   1 byt + zt bwt = (1 )+1   byt   zt   t
Table 2. Numerical values of parameters
Utility function
 = 0:99  = 1:5  = 1:5
 = 0:80 " = 0:0140
Production function
 = 0:3 z = 0:95 "z = 0:0085
Wage stickiness and Dixit-Stiglitz elasticities
 = 0:75 h = 4:0 f = 4:0
Wage indexation rule
ss = 0:0  = 0:80 " = 0:004
Slope coe¢ cients of the wage ination eq.
h = 0:050 f = 0:159
Output gap weights for monetary policy design
h = 0:018 f = 0:057
Table 3. Business cycle statistics.
by  W bw R ey
Annualized standard deviations (%):
Households set wages: 2.58 2.62 0.74 2.18 2.22 1.88
Firms set wages: 1.88 4.01 0.33 3.06 1.22 0.63
Coe¢ cients of autocorrelation:
Households set wages: .95 -.03 .57 .95 .63 .96
Firms set wages: .93 .20 .37 .94 .71 .93
Correlation with output:
Households set wages: 1.0 -.08 -.10 .30 -.14 .73
Firms set wages: 1.0 -.12 .06 .81 .17 .34
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Table 4. Long-run variance decomposition.
by  W bw R ey
Households set wages:
Technology shocks, zt .62 .86 .00 .93 .01 .00
Preference shocks, t .20 .14 .00 .04 .73 .00
Indexation shocks, t .18 <.01 1.0 .03 .26 1.0
Firms set wages:
Technology shocks, zt .74 .68 .00 .75 .01 .00
Preference shocks, t .24 .11 .00 .03 .94 .00
Indexation shocks, t .02 .21 1.0 .22 .05 1.0
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Figure 1: Impulse-response functions under optimal monetary policy. One standard deviation
technology shock.
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Figure 2: Impulse-response functions under optimal monetary policy. One standard deviation
consumption preference shock.
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions under optimal monetary policy. One standard deviation
(nominal) wage indexation shock.
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